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    globalization can activate tensions with national sovereignty by pressuring governments to delegate some control over economic policy to international organizations.

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    Gov 312 Exam #3 Flashcards

    Study with Quizlet and memorize flashcards terms like Which of the following is an example of public goods that an international hegemon helps to provide? A) A currency that acts as a medium of exchange in international trade B) Safe shipping lines C) A market for distressed goods in the global economy D) All of the above, The United States supports China in the maritime disputes over access to the South China Sea. T/F?, Polarity influences coalition and alliance arrangements among great powers. T/F? and more.

    Gov 312 Exam #3

    Which of the following is an example of public goods that an international hegemon helps to provide?

    A) A currency that acts as a medium of exchange in international trade

    B) Safe shipping lines

    C) A market for distressed goods in the global economy

    D) All of the above

    Click card to see definition 👆

    D) All of the above

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    The United States supports China in the maritime disputes over access to the South China Sea. T/F?

    Click card to see definition 👆

    False

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    1/66 Created by BILLYLYNCH22

    Terms in this set (66)

    Which of the following is an example of public goods that an international hegemon helps to provide?

    A) A currency that acts as a medium of exchange in international trade

    B) Safe shipping lines

    C) A market for distressed goods in the global economy

    D) All of the above D) All of the above

    The United States supports China in the maritime disputes over access to the South China Sea. T/F?

    False

    Polarity influences coalition and alliance arrangements among great powers. T/F?

    True

    China's recent increase in naval and maritime activity in the South China Sea is supported by other states in the region because they recognize it will boost overall commerce and security in the region. T/F?

    False

    Hegemonic stability holds that the global concentration of economic and political power in one state tends to promote open international trade. T/F?

    True

    Which of the following is an international organization?

    A) Sovereignty

    B) World Trade Organization

    C) Reciprocity in trade negotiations

    D) All of the above

    B) World Trade Organization

    NATO was create primarily to support free trade in Western Europe. T/F?

    False

    Which of the following is an international institution?

    A) The United Nations

    B) The World Trade Organization

    C) Sovereignty D) All of the above C) Sovereignty

    Some international organizations can facilitate interstate cooperation by enforcing agreements that states reach among themselves. T/F

    True

    The creation of international organizations provokes principle-agent tensions with their member states. What factors worsen this principle-agent relationship?

    A) Multiple principals

    B) Agency slack C) Shirking D) All of the above D) All of the above

    Some research suggests that securing U.N. approval for military action raises public support within the United States for that action. T/F?

    True

    According to lecture, the first major wave of democracy promotion as a centerpiece of American foreign policy came after the Cold War. T/F?

    False

    Robert Dahl's "procedural minimal" preconditions for democracy include:

    A) Individual civil liberties like freedom of speech

    B) Universal adult suffrage (right to vote)

    C) Democratic sovereignty of elected bodies that posses real political power

    D) All of the above D) All of the above

    Which of the following were cited as a cause of the peace among democracies?

    A) Elections

    B) Institutional checks and balances

    C) Shared democratic identity with the other democratic regimes

    D) All of the above D) All of the above

    Democracy can help promote peace among democratic states by solving the commitment problem. T/F?

    True

    During the twentieth century, the population of democratic regimes in the international system has been shocked upward in waves facilitated by diffusion. T/F?

    True

    On average, democratic states tend to win the wars they enter because reelection incentives (namely, the fear of getting voted out of office for policy failures) push democratic leaders to be cautious when going to war. Consequently, democratic leaders generally fight only when they have a high probability of victory. T/F?

    True

    According to the logic of the democratic peace, we are more likely to see a war between the United States and Syria than we are to see a war between the United States and the United Kingdom. T/F?

    True

    Elections in democracies can help promote peace among democratic states by raising the domestic political cost of war. T/F?

    True

    Specialization improves states' domestic economies by giving them absolute advantage in producing a complex good or service, like the iPhone. Acquiring specialization means they can operate independently of all other states in the international system to produce this good. T/F?

    False

    Globalization can activate tensions with national sovereignty by pressuring governments to delegate some control over economic policy to international organizations. T/F?

    True

    President Trump formally withdrew the United States from the Trans Pacific Partnership in 2017. T/F?

    True

    Even though international trade increases national income at an aggregate level, some groups within an economy will see their real incomes decline from globalization. T/F?

    True

    China is a member of the Trans Pacific Partnership. T/F?

    False (the 12 members: U.S, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, and New Zealand)

    Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage suggests that specialization and international trade reduce the national income of an economy. T/F?

    Source : quizlet.com

    5. Global governance in an era of discontent

    OECD's dissemination platform for all published content - books, podcasts, serials and statistics

    5. Global governance in an era of discontent

    Abstract

    This chapter explores the international dimensions of discontent and assesses the capacity of global governance institutions to address the phenomenon. With reference to the COVID-19 pandemic and locust swarms, it demonstrates that discontent in a country is often worsened by shocks that originate outside its borders. The chapter also examines discontent at globalisation itself, as articulated by the Seattle Protests over two decades ago. It then charts the evolution of the multilateral system since the end of the Second World War to understand why global institutions today are struggling to address the causes of discontent, and it examines the constraints to international co-operation in the face of global threats, including the climate crisis. It concludes by examining ways in which the multilateral system needs to adapt to the profound challenges of the 21st century.

    Introduction

    The world is too much with us; late and soon,

    Getting and spending we lay waste our powers (Wordsworth, 1807[1])

    Discontent is a phenomenon that challenges notions of scale. While a protest might be confined to one space such as a city square, participants might come from far away and be motivated by grievances with local, national and global dimensions. This final chapter investigates the causes and complexities of “global” discontent, wherein it finds echoes of the contingent and structural factors discussed earlier in the report, as well as similar institutional failings and power imbalances. It argues that international co-operation must overcome profound challenges to address the sources of discontent at local, national and international level.

    The chapter starts by exploring two categories of global discontent. First, it examines how cross-border phenomena can trigger the causes of discontent identified in Chapters 2 and 3; the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic provides an obvious example. Second, it analyses protests against globalisation itself, in particular, the Seattle protests of 1999. It then explores why international co-operation has fragmented at a time of unprecedented global interconnectedness, and how the legitimacy and effectiveness of multilateralism are called into question when collective action is urgently needed to confront global threats.

    The chapter then examines whether global governance institutions still possess the power to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It argues that private interests are increasingly dominant in today’s world and that countries are locked into economic models that promote the primacy of the market over the state, whether voters like it or not. A new vision of multilateralism that is both empowered and empowering is required to rebalance global power and avert catastrophe. New approaches, new mind-sets and new voices, including those that represent discontented citizens from across the world, are needed on the international stage before it is too late.

    Discontent from abroad

    Chapter 2 describes the contingent factors behind discontent – the economic difficulties, dissatisfaction with public services and lack of voice that are often the most obvious causes of social unrest. Chapter 3 outlines the structural phenomena with which these factors interact, which relate to deep-seated sociological and cultural phenomena, as well as the political factors that are exacerbating inequality and polarisation. So far, the report has analysed these factors through the prism of the nation state, but it is impossible to avoid the fact that, in today’s interconnected world, what happens outside a country’s borders can have a profound effect on events inside those borders, to the extent that they can undermine the approaches to addressing discontent outlined in Chapter 4.

    One need not look far for examples of how global events can worsen discontent. The year 2020 was apocalyptic in a sense observers from the Middle Ages might have recognised. In addition to war, famine, pestilence and death, the year witnessed a near-plague of locusts and blood-red skies brought about by inextinguishable fires. What would have been alien to those same observers, besides the speed with which these phenomena spread from country to country, is that we were in some way responsible for them and could have done more to prevent them. What those observers (and today’s insurance companies) would call Acts of God were symbolic of all-too-human failures: self-interest and short-termism have resulted in a self-imposed vulnerability and a failure to co-operate, even on matters of life and death. Moreover, this vulnerability is not evenly shared: the people and countries suffering most are often those that benefited least from global economic progress in the past three decades.

    This section explains how the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed economic, social and political vulnerabilities within countries the world over, as well as weaknesses in international co-operation. It also examines the emergence of locust swarms across East Africa and West Asia (Box 5.1). These events have caused enormous social and economic damage that relates directly to the contingent causes of discontent discussed in Chapter 2. They have also exposed deep-seated challenges to international co-operation and structural imbalances in global governance that echo Chapter 3. This section then examines how the Seattle protests of more than 20 years ago confirmed the emergence of a globalised civil society capable of challenging the adverse consequences of globalisation.

    Source : www.oecd-ilibrary.org

    PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

    [Senate Prints 115-21]

    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    115th Congress} { S. Prt.

    2nd Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 115-21

    ======================================================================

    PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT

    ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND

    EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR

    U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

    __________

    A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

    PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    UNITED STATES SENATE

    One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

    Second Session January 10, 2018

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

    __________

    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    28-110 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,

    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).

    E-mail, [email protected]

    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

    MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire

    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware

    CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico

    TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut

    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia

    JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon

    RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey

    Todd Womack, Staff Director

    Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director

    John Dutton, Chief Clerk

    (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- Page

    Letter of Transmittal............................................ v

    Executive Summary................................................ 1

    Chapter 1: Putin's Rise and Motivations.......................... 7

    Ascent to the Top............................................ 8

    Return of the Security Services.............................. 10

    The Kremlin's Paranoid Pathology............................. 13

    Chapter 2: Manipulation and Repression Inside Russia............. 15

    Influencing Ideology, Politics, and Culture.................. 17

    Controlling the Public Narrative............................. 24

    Corrupting Economic Activity................................. 31

    Chapter 3: Old Active Measures and Modern Malign Influence

    Operations..................................................... 35

    A Brief History of Soviet Active Measures.................... 37

    Modern Malign Influence Operations........................... 37

    The Kremlin's Disinformation Platforms....................... 40

    Chapter 4: Weaponization of Civil Society, Ideology, Culture,

    Crime, and Energy.............................................. 47

    The Role of State Foundations, GONGOs, NGOs, and Think Tanks. 47

    The Kremlin's Cultivation of Political Extremes.............. 50

    The Use of the Russian Orthodox Church....................... 53

    The Nationalization of Organized Crime....................... 54

    The Export of Corruption..................................... 57

    The Leveraging of Energy Supplies for Influence.............. 58

    Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in Semi-Consolidated Democracies

    and Transitional Governments................................... 65

    Ukraine...................................................... 67

    Georgia...................................................... 73

    Montenegro................................................... 77

    Serbia....................................................... 81

    Bulgaria..................................................... 89

    Hungary...................................................... 94

    Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in Consolidated Democracies...... 99

    Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia................ 100

    Nordic States: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.......... 109

    The Netherlands.............................................. 113

    United Kingdom............................................... 116

    France....................................................... 121

    Germany...................................................... 127

    Spain........................................................ 133

    Italy........................................................ 137

    Chapter 7: Multilateral & U.S. Efforts to Counter the Kremlin's

    Asymmetric Arsenal............................................. 141

    Collective Defenses Against Disinformation and Cyber Attacks. 141

    European Energy Diversification and Integration.............. 144

    EU and U.S. Efforts to Sanction Malicious Actors............. 145

    Source : www.govinfo.gov

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