if you want to remove an article from website contact us from top.

    delegating control over nuclear weapons to subordinates can strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence through something called the threat that leaves something to chance.


    Guys, does anyone know the answer?

    get delegating control over nuclear weapons to subordinates can strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence through something called the threat that leaves something to chance. from EN Bilgi.

    The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks on JSTOR

    Scott D. Sagan, The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000), pp. 85-115

    Skip to Main Content

    JOURNAL ARTICLE Scott D. Sagan

    International Security

    , pp. 85-115 (31 pages)

    Published By: The MIT Press


    Read and download

    Log in through your school or library

    International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on all aspects of the control and use of force, from all political viewpoints. Its articles cover contemporary policy issues, and probe historical and theoretical questions behind them. Essays in International Security have defined the debate on American national security policy and have set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs. Readers of International Security discover new developments in: the causes and prevention of war ethnic conflict and peacekeeping post-Cold War security problems European, Asian, and regional security nuclear forces and strategy arms control and weapons proliferation post-Soviet security issues diplomatic and military history

    Among the largest university presses in the world, The MIT Press publishes over 200 new books each year along with 30 journals in the arts and humanities, economics, international affairs, history, political science, science and technology along with other disciplines. We were among the first university presses to offer titles electronically and we continue to adopt technologies that allow us to better support the scholarly mission and disseminate our content widely. The Press's enthusiasm for innovation is reflected in our continuing exploration of this frontier. Since the late 1960s, we have experimented with generation after generation of electronic publishing tools. Through our commitment to new products—whether digital journals or entirely new forms of communication—we have continued to look for the most efficient and effective means to serve our readership. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring.

    This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.

    For terms and use, please refer to our

    International Security © 2000 The MIT Press

    Source : www.jstor.org

    [Senate Hearing 115-439]

    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    S. Hrg. 115-439








    FIRST SESSION __________ NOVEMBER 14, 2017 __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


    Available via the World Wide Web:



    34-311 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019


    BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman



    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire


    CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico

    TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut

    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia

    JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts


    RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey

    Todd Womack, Staff Director

    Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director

    John Dutton, Chief Clerk

    (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- Page

    Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 1

    Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland............. 2

    Kehler, General C. Robert, U.S. Air Force, Retired, Former

    Commander, United States Strategic Command, Alexandria, VA..... 4

    Prepared statement........................................... 6

    Feaver, Ph.D., Peter D., Professor of Political Science and

    Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC..................... 8

    Prepared statement........................................... 10

    McKeon, Hon. Brian, Former Acting Under Secretary for Policy,

    U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC..................... 13

    Prepared statement........................................... 15

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to

    General C. Robert Kehler, USAF (Ret.) by Senator Cory A. Booker 42

    Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Dr.

    Peter Feaver by Senator Cory A. Booker......................... 43

    Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to

    Hon. Brian P. McKeon by Senator John Barrasso.................. 44

    Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to

    Hon. Brian P. McKeon by Senator Cory A. Booker................. 44

    Union of Concerned Scientists--Fact Sheet, ``Close Calls with

    Nuclear Weapons'' (2015)....................................... 46





    TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2017

    U.S. Senate,

    Committee on Foreign Relations,

    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in

    Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,

    chairman of the committee, presiding.

    Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio,

    Johnson, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Flake, Cardin, Shaheen,

    Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Merkley.



    The Chairman. The hearing itself will actually come to

    order. We thank General Kehler, Dr. Feaver, and Mr. McKeon for

    joining us today and for sitting through the business meeting

    over the last 15 minutes.

    A number of members on both sides of the aisle on and off

    the committee have raised questions about the executive's

    authorities with respect to war-making, the use of nuclear

    weapons, and, from a diplomatic perspective, entering into and

    terminating agreements with other countries. As I have

    mentioned publicly, this is one in a series of hearings where

    our committee will examine all of these issues. But today, it

    is my hope that we will remain focused on the topic at hand,

    the authority and the process for the use of nuclear weapons.

    The Congressional Research Service tells us this is the

    first time that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate

    or House has met on this topic since 1976, 41 years ago.

    Making the decision to go to war of any sort is a heavy

    responsibility for our Nation's elected leaders, and the

    decision to use nuclear weapons is the most consequential of

    all. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the subsequent practices

    recognize that the use of nuclear weapons must be subject to

    political control. This is why no general or admiral or Defense

    Secretary has the authority to order the use of nuclear

    weapons. Only the President, the elected political leader of

    the United States, has this authority.

    The nuclear arms race between the United States and the

    Source : www.govinfo.gov

    Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute f

    Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” , Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)


    What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? I say ‘spread rather than prolifer­ation’ because so far nuclear weapons have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much. Short-term candidates for the nuclear club are not very numerous. and they are not likely to rush into the nuclear military busi­ness. Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally join­ing the club. Counting India and Israel, membership grew to seven in the first 35 years of the nuclear age. A doubling of membership in this decade would be surprising. Since rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the spread of nuclear weapons is fortunate.

    Someday the world will be populated by ten or twelve or eighteen nuclear-weapon states (hereafter referred to as nuclear states). What the further spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is therefore a compelling question.

    Most people believe that the world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread. The chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally exploded in a way that prompts a nuclear exchange are finite, though unknown. Those chances increase as the number of nuclear states increase. More is therefore worse. Most people also believe that the chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the new nuclear states—their sense of responsibility, inclination toward devotion to the political and administrative competence. Ifthe supply of states of good character is limited as is widely thought, then the larger the number of nuclear states, the greater the chances of nuclear war become. If nuclear weapons are acquired by countries whose governments totter and frequently fall, should we not worry more about the world’s destruction then we do now? And if nuclear weapons are acquired by two states that are traditional and bitter rivals, should that not also foster our concern?

    Predictions on grounds such as the above point less to likelihoods and more to dangers that we can all imagine. They identify some possibilities among many, and identifying more of the possibilities would not enable one to say how they are likely to unfold in a world made different by the slow spread of nuclear weapons. We want to know both the likelihood that new dangers will manifest themselves and what the possibilities of their mitigation may be. We want to be able to see the future world, so to speak, rather than merely imagining ways in which it may be a better or a worse one.  How can we predict more surely? In two ways:  by deducing expectations from the structure of the international political system and by inferring expectations from past events and patterns. With those two tasks accomplished in the first part of this paper, I shall ask in the second part whether increases in the number of nuclear states will introduce differences that are dangerous and destabilizing.


    The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in this cen­tury—if peace is defined as the absence of general war among the major states of the world. The Second World War followed the first one within twenty-one years. As of 1980 35 years had elapsed since the Allies’ victory over the Axis powers.  Conflict marks all human affairs. In the past third of a century, conflict has generated hostility among states and has at times issued in violence among the weaker and smaller ones. Even though the more powerful states of the world have occasionally been direct participants, war has been confined geographically and limited mili­tarily. Remarkably, general war has been avoided in a period of rapid and far-reaching changes—decolonization; the rapid economic growth of some states; the formation. tighten­ing, and eventual loosening of blocs; the devel­opment of new technologies; and the emer­gence of new strategies for fighting guerrilla wars and deterring nuclear ones. The pre­valence of peace, together with the fighting of circumscribed wars, indicates a high ability of the post-war international system to absorb changes and to contain conflicts and hostility.

    Presumably features found in the post-war system that were not present earlier account for the world's recent good fortune. The biggest changes in the post-war world are the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity and the intro­duction of nuclear weapons.

    The Effects of Bipolarity

    Bipolarity has produced two outstandingly good effects. They are seen by contrasting multipolar and bipolar worlds. First, in a multipolar world there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low. With three or more powers, flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain. S6 long as the system is one of fairly small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the secur­ity of others. There are too many to enable anyone to see for sure what is happening. and too few to make what is happening a matter of indifference.

    Source : www.mtholyoke.edu

    Do you want to see answer or more ?
    James 9 day ago

    Guys, does anyone know the answer?

    Click For Answer